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rity is compromised in government. They 
can fiercely protect university indepen-
dence. And they can defend peers who be-
come political targets for speaking up (17).
We maintain hope that these concerns 
will not be realized. But the scientific com-
munity is well positioned for what may lie 
ahead. Already, scientific societies have 
asked the Trump Administration to appoint 
a science adviser and more than 5500 sci-
entists have signed a letter asking the Ad-
ministration to uphold scientific integrity 
(18). Alarms must sound when science is 
silenced, manipulated, or otherwise com-
promised. When science is sidelined from 
policy decisions, we all lose.  j
REFERENCES AND NOTES
 1. L. M. Krauss, New Yorker, 13 December 2016); 
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/
donald-trumps-war-on-science.
 2. S. Otto, The War on Science: Who’s Waging It, Why It 
Matters, What We Can Do About It (Milkweed Editions, 
Minneapolis, MN, 2016).
 3. UCS, “Preserving scientific integrity in federal policy-
making: Lessons from the past two Administrations 
and what’s at stake under the Trump Administration” 
(UCS, Cambridge, MA, 2017); www.ucsusa.org/
preservingscientificintegrity.
 4. C. Mooney, The Republican War on Science (Basic Books, 
New York, 2005).
 5. Office of Inspector General, Department of the Interior, 
Investigative report: On allegations against Julie 
MacDonald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish, Wildlife, 
and Parks (Department of Interior, Washington, DC, 
2006); https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/
Macdonald.pdf.
 6. A. C. Revkin, “Bush vs. the laureates: How science became 
a partisan issue,” New York Times, 19 October 2004, p. F1; 
www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/science/19poli.html.
 7. UCS, Scientist statement on restoring scientific integrity 








 9. E. Williamson, Washington Post, 1 May 2007; www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/01/
AR2007050101920.html.
 10. F. Grifo et al., Federal Science and the Public Good (UCS, 
Cambridge, MA, 2008); www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/
Federal-Science-and-the-Public-Good-12-08-Update.pdf.
 11. G. Goldman et al., “Progress and problems: Government 
scientists report on scientific integrity at four agen-
cies” (UCS, Cambridge, MA, 2015); www.ucsusa.org/
scientistsurvey.
 12.  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, FY 2015 
Allegations (EPA, 2015); https://www.epa.gov/osa/
fy-2015-allegations.
 13. W. Wagner, E. McGarrity, Bending Science: How Special 
Interests Corrupt Public Health Research (Harvard Univ. 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012).
 14. P. Ryan, A Better Way (2016); http://paulryan.house.gov/
top5issues/a-better-way-our-vision-for-a-confident-
america.htm.
 15. Office of Management and Budget, “Draft report to 
Congress on the benefits and costs of federal regulations 
and agency compliance with the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act” (OMB, 2015); https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_reports_congress/.
 16. A. A. Rosenberg et al., Science 348, 964 (2015).
 17.  M. Halpern, M. Mann, Science 348, 479 (2015).
 18. UCS, An open letter to President-elect Trump and the 




CRISPR, surrogate licensing, 
and scientific discovery
Have research universities abandoned their public focus?
By Jorge L. Contreras1 and 
Jacob S. Sherkow2
S
everal institutions are embroiled in 
a legal dispute over the foundational 
patent rights to CRISPR-Cas9 gene-
editing technology, and it may take 
years for their competing claims to 
be resolved (1–4). But even before 
ownership of the patents 
is finalized, the institu-
tions behind CRISPR have 
wasted no time capitaliz-
ing on the huge market for 
this groundbreaking tech-
nology by entering into 
a series of license agree-
ments with commercial 
enterprises (see the fig-
ure). With respect to the 
potentially lucrative mar-
ket for human therapeu-
tics and treatments, each 
of the key CRISPR patent 
holders has granted exclu-
sive rights to a spinoff or 
“surrogate” company formed by the insti-
tution and one of its principal researchers 
(5, 6). Although this model, in which a uni-
versity effectively outsources the licensing 
and commercialization of a valuable pat-
ent portfolio to a private company, is not 
uncommon in the world of university tech-
nology transfer, we suggest it could rapidly 
bottleneck the use of CRISPR technology 
to discover and develop useful human 
therapeutics.
Several patterns emerge from the web 
of transactions shown in the figure (we 
make the documents used in our analysis 
available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/ 
dataverse/crisprlicenses). The right to use 
CRISPR techniques has been divided into 
three broad “fields of use”: (i) basic, non-
commercial research; (ii) development 
and sale of tools (kits, reagents, and equip-
ment) that aid CRISPR-based gene edit-
ing; and (iii) development, sale, and use of 
therapeutics and treatments using CRISPR 
techniques. This last field broadly covers 
the most commercially significant applica-
tions and includes gene editing to develop 
agricultural products, veterinary medicine, 
and human diagnostics and therapeutics.
Precisely demarcating these fields of 
use—especially for a flexible, broadly ap-
plicable technology like 
CRISPR—and awarding 
appropriate license grants 
can be challenging. None-
theless, the institutions 
have largely granted non-
exclusive licenses with 
respect to noncommer-
cial research and tools 
development. This means 
that licensees, including 
academic researchers, are 
permitted to engage in 
these activities, but do not 
have the right to market 
and sell products derived 
from their research. It also 
means that the CRISPR patent holders are 
free to grant licenses for their respective 
technologies to other research institutions. 
However, in the case of therapeutics and 
treatments, with few exceptions, exclusive 
licenses to surrogate companies (Editas, 
Caribou, or CRISPR Therapeutics) pre-
vent the institution from granting similar 
licenses to other companies without the 
surrogate’s permission. Caribou’s exclu-
sive license covers all fields of use, and it 
has in turn granted an exclusive license in 
the field of human therapeutics to Intellia 
Therapeutics.
SURROGATE LICENSING AND CRISPR
The companies to which the patent-hold-
ing institutions grant exclusive licenses 
effectively stand in as surrogates for the 
institutions themselves. These surrogates 
control a large and lucrative field for the 
exploitation of the licensed technology, 
and have significant freedom both to ex-
ploit it themselves and to seek partners 
and sublicensees. The surrogates take on 
the role of the patent owner and retain a 
lion’s share of the resulting profits. Many 
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universities prefer this model because it 
gives them a substantial share of profits 
with minimal risk through, for example, 
equity stakes in their researchers’ surro-
gate companies (7, 8).
The surrogate licensing model, in the-
ory, permits the university to focus on a 
broader range of commercialization proj-
ects with a limited staff, and delegates the 
job of licensing to experts focused on the 
relevant technology. Although a university 
could license its rights individually to the 
range of commercial enterprises illustrated 
in the figure, it is often more efficient to 
grant rights in bulk to a single company 
and let that company scour the market for 
viable licensing candidates. The university 
profits from its equity interest in the sur-
rogate and from any royalties that are gen-
erated by the technology.
In addition, the individual investiga-
tors, who often have a substantial equity 
interest in the surrogate company, stand to 
profit far more than they otherwise would. 
For all of these reasons, the surrogate li-
censing model has become popular with 
universities, investigators, and companies 
across a wide range of technologies (7, 8).
We reviewed all of the CRISPR surrogate 
license agreements made publicly avail-
able through filings with the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, requests 
under state and federal “freedom-of-infor-
mation” acts, and through press releases 
and public announcements. In each of the 
principal surrogate licenses that we re-
viewed, the patent-holding institution has 
granted its surrogate the exclusive right to 
use CRISPR to develop human therapeu-
tics targeting any of the 20,000+ genes 
that comprise the human genome. Because 
no single company could develop, test, and 
market therapeutics on the basis of even a 
fraction of the entire human genome, the 
surrogates are authorized and expected to 
sublicense their rights to others.
Despite this, it is still unlikely that any 
of the surrogate companies could explore a 
significant fraction of the potential human 
health applications that CRISPR could 
enable, even with a range of experienced 
commercial partners and collaborators. If 
an unlicensed company has the expertise 
and wherewithal to develop a novel hu-
man therapy using CRISPR—even if that 
therapy concerns a previously unexplored 
gene—that company might not be able to 
obtain the sublicense necessary to under-
take this work. In some instances, such as 
the license to Editas from the Broad Insti-
tute of MIT and Harvard, the institution 
retains some right to entertain proposals 
from other companies if the surrogate is 
not pursuing work on a specific gene and 
does not plan to do so in the future. The 
scope of this limitation, however, is narrow 
and still leaves all “unclaimed” portions of 
the genome in the surrogate’s hands.
Further, traditional contractual safe-
guards against overbroad exclusive li-
censes will likely work poorly under this 
model. Diligence milestones, for example, 
require an exclusive licensee to demon-
strate progress toward commercialization 
of a licensed technology (often through the 
achievement of various regulatory hurdles, 
testing, and trials). But a surrogate can 
easily show some progress in some subset 
of a broader field to meet this require-
ment, even if it does not intend to, or can-
not, pursue all aspects of the licensed field. 
Giving one company an exclusive right to 
use CRISPR to develop human therapies 
targeting every segment of the human ge-
nome could thus limit the creation of po-
tentially beneficial therapies.
NONEXCLUSIVITY AND RESEARCH TOOLS 
CRISPR is a broadly applicable, enabling 
technology platform, similar in many re-
spects to “research tools”: equipment, re-
agents, and methods that enable a broad 
range of downstream research (9). Exclu-
sive rights in research tools are gener-
ally unnecessary for commercialization 
of downstream products developed using 
them. Rather, exclusive licenses are only 
needed with respect to specific therapeu-
tic uses discovered using those tools. For 
example, a molecular drug target may be 
discovered using research tools like the 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) but then 
require considerable and costly product 
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approval before it can be marketed (9).
For this reason, in 1999 the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) recommended 
that patents on research tools devel-
oped using federal funding be licensed 
nonexclusively to promote their greatest 
utilization, commercialization, and pub-
lic availability (9). In 2007, eleven major 
U.S. research universities—including the 
University of California, Berkeley (UCB), 
Harvard, and Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), all of which have made 
CRISPR patent claims—committed to a 
set of core licensing values, known as the 
“Nine Points,” one of which states that uni-
versities should make patented research 
tools as broadly available as possible (10).
Although CRISPR is not necessarily a 
“research tool” in that its function is gener-
ally not to enable downstream research, it 
is a broadly applicable “platform” technol-
ogy—like stem cells or the Internet—that 
could enable innumerable specific applica-
tions. To that end, foundational CRISPR 
patents, like patents covering research 
tools, should be licensed and disseminated 
as widely as possible especially when de-
veloped with public funding by universi-
ties operating in the public interest (11–14).
To their credit, the UCB and the Broad 
Institute have not sought to limit academic 
research through their exclusive CRISPR 
licenses (1). Both have made many of their 
CRISPR research tools available freely or 
cheaply through AddGene, a nonprofit 
organization in service of academic and 
nonprofit institutions (1, 14). Likewise, as 
noted above, the institutions have granted 
nonexclusive licenses in the area of tool 
development.
But the exclusive licenses granted to 
the institutions’ surrogates for human 
therapeutics limit access to CRISPR as a 
platform technology, potentially hinder-
ing competition and creating innovation 
bottlenecks. For example, the Broad’s sur-
rogate, Editas, has granted Juno Thera-
peutics an exclusive license to develop a 
host of CRISPR therapies—across multiple 
genes—using chimeric antigen receptor T 
cell (CAR-T) technology (15). This broad 
license threatens to complicate both re-
search and development for CRISPR-based 
CAR-T technologies for gene targets cho-
sen by Juno, but that neither Editas nor 
Juno have the bandwidth to pursue. In 
other instances, overly broad exclusive li-
censes may hinder research into socially 
valuable—but unprofitable—therapeutics, 
such as those indicated for rare diseases 
or treating illnesses prevalent in disadvan-
taged populations or regions, a separate 
yet equally important principle advanced 
in the Nine Points document.
Situations like these—in which exclu-
sive licenses have the potential to extend 
beyond that which can be developed—are 
precisely what the NIH guidelines and the 
Nine Points sought to avoid. Yet the sur-
rogate licensing model adopted by the 
CRISPR patent-holding institutions seem-
ingly allows them to circumvent this pro-
scription by ceding licensing authority to 
private companies not bound by the guide-
lines and Nine Points.
RECONCEPTUALIZING CRISPR LICENSING
Given the potential bottlenecks created 
by the current surrogate licensing model, 
UCB, Harvard, and MIT should broaden 
access to CRISPR technology for human 
therapeutics. Given that the technology 
is developing rapidly and, 
in some instances, now be-
ing disputed among the 
parties, there is still time 
to do so. This dynamism in 
CRISPR’s patent landscape 
should provide the impetus 
for these institutions—and 
their surrogate companies—
both to amend their existing 
agreements and to cross-
license their respective patent rights to one 
another. And these cross-licenses need not 
be exclusive.
As an example, Broad and UCB could 
reserve their rights to license CRISPR to 
other commercial firms engaged in thera-
peutic research on areas of the genome 
that their surrogates do not have a reason-
able plan to develop. The institutions could 
thus open up larger swaths of the genome 
to beneficial commercial research. Both 
UCB and Broad have recently shown some 
attraction to this approach by announcing 
limited cross-licensing agreements with 
other institutions, albeit not with one an-
other (16, 17). A more flexible licensing ap-
proach would result in greater competition 
and innovation in the marketplace—in the 
spirit of the Nine Points agreement.
The emergence of CRISPR as an impor-
tant new platform technology should also 
prompt NIH to update its guidelines re-
garding the licensing of federally funded 
inventions. Platform technologies such 
as CRISPR should be recognized as offer-
ing the same potential for industry-wide 
innovation and discovery as traditional 
research tools. A similar updating of, and 
recommitment to, the Nine Points may 
also be in order.
As the National Academies of Science 
have noted, “the first goal of university 
technology transfer involving (intellec-
tual property) is the expeditious and wide 
dissemination of university-generated 
technology for the public good” (12). The 
institutions controlling patent rights in 
CRISPR have delegated that responsibility 
to surrogate companies, which determine 
how many or few commercial firms will 
be able to exploit it. We urge these institu-
tions to rethink their use of exclusive, sur-
rogate licenses across the entire genome. 
Those institutions should ensure that any 
exclusive licenses are narrowly drawn to 
specific genes, to maximize competition in 
the development of the revolutionary tech-
nology they have created.  j
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should be recognized as offering the 
same potential for industry-wide 
innovation and discovery as traditional 
research tools.”
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